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ARGUMENT 
The June 25, 2015 Judgment was not a valid final judgment when it was entered. 
Lanham takes with one relatively insignificant paragraph 
Appellate Brief. However, contrary to Judd Lanham's arguments, Thomas Lanham does not 
assert that June 25, 2014 judgment is not a final judgment for purposes of this appeal. Instead, 
Thomas Lanham attempts to point out how the characterization of the judgment/order at the time 
the Motion for Reconsideration was filed is important for determining the applicable rule. 
A Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) motion for reconsideration applies to: 1) interlocutory orders; and 2) 
any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment. In Boise lvfode, LLC v. Donahoe 
Pace & Partners, LTD, this court added that the second type of motion to reconsider applies to 
orders that are made "after entry of final judgment ... and pursuant to a party's Rule 59( e) 
motion." 154 Idaho 99, 106 (2013 ). A motion to reconsider a final judgment is treated as a Rule 
59(e) motion. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71 (2008). Additionally, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has held that a motion to reconsider a final judgment is timely and proper even when 
made before the formal entry of judgment. Willis v. Larsen, l l O Idaho 818, 821 (Idaho App. Ct. 
1986). 
Although the Judgment entered June 25, 2014 is to be treated as a valid final judgment, it 
was not a valid final judgment when it was entered. If not a final judgment, what was it? If 
characterized as an interlocutory order, then the motion was timely filed before the entry of final 
judgment. If characterized as a final judgment, the motion, albeit premature, was nonetheless 
timely under IRCP 59(e), IRCP ll(a)(2)(B), and relevant case law. 
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B. Thomas Lanham had no obligation to file a notice of hearing with his motion. 
Judd Lanham's assertion that Thomas Lanham was required to notice his motion 
hearing is incorrect. See Marcher v. Butler, 133 Idaho 867, 869 (1988). In Marcher, a plaintiff 
filed a motion to alter or amend judgment 14 days after the entry of judgment. Id. at 868. The 
motion remained dormant for almost a year. Id. Eventually, both the plaintiff and defendant 
filed memoranda in support and opposition to the motion. Id. The motion was denied and the 
plaintiff appealed. Id. at 869. On appeal, the defendant argued that plaintiffs failure to notice 
up the hearing was grounds for dismissal without notice, but the court disagreed. Id. There, the 
court held that "the time for appealing the district court's summary judgment order was tolled by 
[the plaintiffs] motion to alter or amend the judgment," and stated that pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7(D) "the court may dismiss [a] motion without notice, [but it] clearly does not 
require this, and does not even establish a time frame in which filed motions must be noticed up 
for argument." Id. 
In another case, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that " [ w ]hether the trial court rules on 
[a] motion within the forty-two day [appeals] period is not within the control of the party 
bringing the motion; therefore that party should not be penalized should the district court fail to 
act on the motion within the appeal period." Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818,822 (1986). In that 
case, the motion for reconsideration was filed before the entry of final judgment. Id. at 821. In 
drawing analogy to IAR 17(e)(2), the court stated, "We find that where, as here, judgment has 
been pronounced in open court, requiring a litigant to wait to seek reconsideration until the court 
clerk has file-stamped the formal judgment would be hypertechnical and violate the spirit of the 
rules." Id. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a movant to file a notice of hearing. 
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While written motions may be decided at a hearing, they may also be decided without a hearing 
on memoranda submitted by the parties. the plain meaning ofIRCP 7(b) only 
that motions and notices of hearings be filed and served at least 14 days before a 
hearing, if any. It does not require that a notice of hearing be filed. Idaho precedent 
demonstrates that some motions can remain pending for extensive periods of time. Even so, 
assuming arguendo, that the magistrate court "dismissed the motion without notice," the earliest 
that it could have dismissed the motion is July 4, 2014, which would still mean that the appeal 
was filed within the 42 day requirement. There is simply no requirement that Thomas Lanham 
file a notice of hearing. 
C. Thomas Lanham's Motion for Reconsideration tolled the appeals period. 
IRCP 83(e) suspends the time for filing an appeal where a party timely files one of the 
following: 1) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 2) a motion to amend or make 
additional findings of fact or conclusions of law; 3) a motion to alter or amend the judgment; and 
4) a motion for a new trial. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that both motions to reconsider 
and motions to amend a judgment toll the time for filing an appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 
14(a). Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 
661 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). 
If characterized as a final judgment, Thomas Lanham' s motion for reconsideration tolls 
the appeals period under IRCP 83(e)(3). Since Idaho Courts treat motions to reconsider final 
judgments as both l l(a)(2)(B) and 59(e) motions, Thomas Lanham's motion for reconsideration 
tolls the appeals period until the motion for reconsideration is denied. See Boise Mode, LLC v. 
Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, 154 Idaho 99, 106 (2013). Judd Lanham accurately points out 
the erroneous citation ofIRCP 83(e)(2), where IRCP (e)(3) is clearly more applicable. However, 
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since this is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review, Judd Lanham's 
"'=iivac that 
foundation. 
D. Judd Lanham is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
This is a relatively novel issue for Idaho. In fact, this is likely a novel issue for most 
states. See Street v. Street, 936 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). In Mississippi, the court 
followed the "settled" authority of the Federal Courts and held that a Rule 59(e) motion was 
timely even though it was filed before the entry of final judgment. Id. at 1008-1009. Moreover, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has already held that premature motions for reconsideration are 
timely in situations like this where the court's decision is declared in open court. Willis v. 
Larsen, l l O Idaho 818, 822 (1986). 
Judd Lanham ignores the weight of authority that holds that motions for reconsideration 
may be filed before the formal entry of judgment. In doing so, Judd Lanham alleges that these 
courts have reached "absurd" results and accuses Thomas Lanham of engaging in frivolous 
conduct. However, other than pointing out an accidental citation to an ineffective version of 
IRCP 54(a), Judd Lanham's accusations are baseless and without foundation. Thomas Lanham 
has not engaged in any conduct that could be construed as frivolous. 
On the other hand, Judd Lanham' s argument that Thomas Lanham needed to file a notice 
of hearing is entirely without merit and directly contrary to the plain language of the rules and 
established Idaho case law. Moreover, Judd Lanham's mischaracterization of several of Thomas 
Lanham's arguments is troubling. To the extent that the court finds frivolous conduct, it should 
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thomas Lanham was not required to a notice hearing on motion 
and timely motion the appeals period at very least 14 
Therefore, Thomas Lanham respectfully requests that this court reverse and vacate the District 
Court's Order Dismissing the appeal and vacate its award of attorney's fees. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2015. 
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